

Hidden language 'battles' in the diaspora: Linguistic identities and ideologies towards home and host languages among Pakistanis in Barcelona

Maria Sabaté-Dalmau[1,2]

Abstract: Following a critical sociolinguistics approach to language maintenance in the diaspora, this paper investigates interplaying linguistic identities and ideologies towards home and host languages among four case-study Pakistanis living in Catalonia, a Catalan/Spanish-speaking European society. By drawing on fieldnotes, interviews, naturally-occurring conversations and visual materials gathered in a Barcelona call shop, it shows how informants invest in Spanish as the 'integration' language, despite being categorised as 'deficient' users of it. They present themselves as 'native' speakers of Urdu, which indexes modern 'Muslimness' and 'Pakistaniness', while Punjabi users, associated with the 'yokels', are silenced. English is ambivalently taken-up as an intra-group sign of educational status and political power and as an anti-Muslim 'coloniser' language. Overall, these stratifying sociolinguistic behaviours reveal how Pakistanis' home/host multilingual resources get re-ideologised through linguistic hierarchisations which foster the maintenance of majority languages only, dismissing minority language speakers, in unchartered transnational contexts where these are already 'delanguaged'.

Keywords: Language ideology; linguistic identity; language maintenance; transnational migration; Pakistani diaspora; Catalonia

[1] Universitat de Lleida, Departament d'Anglès i Lingüística, Plaça Víctor Siurana 1, 25003 Lleida, Catalonia, Spain. E-mail: <maria.sabate@dal.udl.cat>; http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6058-7227

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1. South-Asian migrants in Europe: The case of Pakistanis in Catalonia

Mass migration to Catalonia, a society of approximately 7.5 million inhabitants located in North-Eastern Spain, occurred during the first decade of the twenty-first century, later though more intensely than in other European countries (Codó, 2008). Most migrant registrations took place in 2000, 2001 and 2005, when the Spanish government (in control of citizenship in Catalonia), on having the highest percentage of undocumented populations in Europe, issued three extraordinary legalisation campaigns (Sànchez, 2008: 251). These campaigns were a strategy to meet the pressing European requirements concerning the common supranational standards for the control of 'illegal'[1] foreigners, because they allowed the Spanish Ministry of the Interior to obtain a record and to police undocumented migrants by registering them as 'visitors' or 'temporary residents' (Kostova Karaboytcheva, 2006).

Partly as a consequence of these newer mechanisms of migrant bureaucratic registration and control, the percentage of transnational populations residing in Catalonia increased notably between 2000 and 2010; particularly for 'foreigners' born in South Asia, who became the fourth migrant group, mostly composed of Pakistanis, accounting for 2.94% of the total population in Catalonia (Idescat, 2018a). This Pakistani community consisted basically of single men of varied socioeconomic and religious backgrounds, aged 30.4 on average (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2011), whose migratory trajectory to this host society was a way to enter the European Union (EU) in order to protect transnational-family economies and to seek socioeconomic advancement (Feixas Vihé, 2009).

1.1. Legality and employment context

Pakistanis in the diaspora mostly settled in Barcelona, the Catalan capital. This choice of locality was an informed decision undertaken before migrating, after they had established contacts with one of the most powerful diasporic Pakistani networks in Europe. This network had managed to engage in a particular work policy that granted them 'documentation' on condition that they registered (and self-identified) as 'self-employed micro-entrepreneurs' in the Spanish Social Security (Solé, Parella & Cavalcanti, 2007). With this legalisation 'tactic', self-employment increased notably, and accounted, for the first time, for 23.42% of all foreigners' registrations in the Catalan Social Security system (Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, 2010). Of all registered Pakistanis, 13.09% of them opted for this formula in order to access temporary legality status (Secretaria de la Immigració, 2009).

The new self-employed Pakistani entrepreneurs, together with other groups of business-minded migrants mostly from China, Romania and Bulgaria (Migracat, 2011), quickly transformed the small local shops that were then available for rent in the Barcelona metropolitan area into 'Chinese' bazaars, 'Latino' hairdressers and 'Pakistani' call shops. These migrant-tailored 'ethnic' businesses became a success, and transnational micro-entrepreneurs soon required employees in order to man them. Following profit-making market rationalities aimed at attracting cheap labour, migrant employers started to recruit co-nationals with whom they had no family ties or emotional involvement (Solé, Parella & Cavalcanti, 2008), offering those migrants in need of 'documents' part-time contracts that, in actual practice, were frequently underpaid and led to exploitative work-hiring practices (Sabaté i Dalmau, 2014).

1.2. Sociolinguistic context

The sociolinguistic context that Pakistani employers and employees found during their incorporation process in Barcelona is as follows. Catalonia is a bilingual society with a majority and a minority language, Spanish and Catalan, whose public and private uses and social meanings, linked to local identity issues, are very complex. Spanish is the dominant language of all territories comprised under the Spanish nation-state, as well as a global lingua franca. Today, this dominance is reinforced by a political project of recentralisation geared towards Spanish-only policies (Pujolar, 2015), which includes a language test demanding a basic level of Spanish as a requirement for 'naturalisation' (BOE, 2015: 105524). Catalan is a minority language which has been historically persecuted and politically, economically and culturally minoritised (see Woolard, 2016). It is not recognised as an official language by the EU, and it is regarded as a 'vernacular' code, despite the Catalan government's attempts to present it to migrants as a de-politicised 'language for everybody' (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2016). Foreign populations are addressed in, and tend to choose to learn, the majority language first (Pujolar, 2010). In this sense, Spanish has become the 'barometer' whereby to judge migrants' degree of 'integration', in institutional and non-institutional contexts, and among migrants themselves (Sabaté-Dalmau, 2018). This is so despite the fact that Catalan is also required for socialisation, as a command of it, along with Spanish, may ensure access to key citizenship resources (like more employment opportunities) in Catalonia.

Linguistic diversity has been recognised in most institutional arenas (e.g. in public administration), and more than 300 allochthonous languages have been registered by Catalan authorities (Linguamón, 2010). However, there are no specific policies

protecting them, and their management is somehow unrealistic, conducted via the symbolic (non-utilitarian) recognition of very few migrants' nation-state languages. Urdu, for example, which is the privileged statutory 'national' language in Pakistan along with English (categorised as the 'official' language), now has some minor presence in Catalan schools' 'linguistic diversity' programs, 'ethnic' businesses' commercial signs, and foreign worker associations' documents (Linguapax, 2017). Most Pakistanis in Catalonia, though, have a limited command of Urdu only, since they come from regions where the most frequently used language is Punjabi, a devalorised 'regional' language with no institutional roles in Pakistan. In fact, Urdu is estimated to be the mother tongue of only a small minority (7.35% - 7.57% of the Pakistani population), whereas Punjabi is estimated to be the home language of almost half (44.15%) of the Pakistani population, according to the latest approximate calculations provided by Rahman (2006: 73) and the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2017). This provides evidence that migrants' home languages remain largely unknown (and not effectively managed) in Catalonia.

2. The research project

2.1. Aims of the study

The aim of this paper is (1) to investigate the *language practices* and *ideologies* of a small network of Pakistani migrants in Barcelona concerning both their *host* and *home languages*, and (2) to explore how these may account for their local and global *linguistic identity ascriptions* or *disaffiliations*. More specifically, it analyses Pakistanis' views on Spanish and Catalan, and focuses on how these interplay with, and mutually

inform, their conceptions of Urdu, English and Punjabi,[2] in presentations of the self and of others as legitimate or non-legitimate (native) speakers of these languages. I depart from the assumption that the incorporation of Pakistani migrants' uses and sociolinguistic behaviours towards *all the languages* involved in their socialisation processes in Catalonia is crucial in order to provide a comprehensive rationale of their complex multilingual communication dynamics in the diaspora. The third objective is (3) to understand the extent to which, how, and why, this small Pakistani network re-territorialises home-language uses and social meanings and *invest in home language(s) maintenance*. All in all, this paper suggests that the analysis of Pakistani migrants' ideologies and (dis)-affiliations towards both home and host languages may offer a picture of truly diasporic (i.e. simultaneously locally *and* globally informed) sociolinguistic behaviours. This may contribute to problematize understandings of migrants' linguistic incorporation practices that focus mostly on transnational populations' (unidirectional) enculturation into host-society norms, downplaying the roles that home language practices and linguistic identity affiliations, socially re-stratified and 'hierarchised' (Phillipson, 1997: 238) in the diaspora, may play in them (see Kuczynski, Parkin & Pitman, 2014; Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2002).

2.2. Theoretical considerations

I take a *critical sociolinguistics ethnographic approach* to the social meanings of language ideologies and identities of the global era, and I understand them as being mutually constitutive (Duchêne, Moyer & Roberts, 2013). Following this perspective, I interpret the informants' positionings towards host and home languages in *political*

economic terms (Flubacher, Duchêne & Coray, 2018). That is, I argue that they need to be explored as being ingrained both into the local language dynamics and norms in which informants socialise and into the global socioeconomic processes and political structures which govern citizenship regimes (for example, via language tests for 'naturalisation') and language-based personhood legitimacies (in Catalonia, Pakistan, and elsewhere).

I conceive of *language ideologies* as empirically observable indexes of the institutional as well as the mundane social norms which materialise in, and govern, daily individual and collective language comportments and attitudes towards languages in a particular time and space (Schieffelin, Woolard & Kroskrity, 1998). Similarly, I understand *linguistic identity practices* or *acts* as a lens into how individuals affirm, accept or reject who they (and others) are, in situated communicative interactions. That is, I approach presentations of the self as tools to explore how informants negotiate the other- or self-ascription of particular language resources (like 'native-speakerhood', 'standardness' or 'accent') leading to the emergence of particular ethnolinguistic categorisations, belongings and affiliations (Heller, 2010).

The framework outlined here places emphasis on *the multilingual individual* as the mobiliser of language practices, identities and ideologies, and *as the agent and the locus of language maintenance* and language change/shift in transnational contexts (see Pujolar & O'Rourke, 2016). In this project, though, a word of caution concerning the concept of the *migrant (home/host languages) multilingual speaker* is in order. The sociolinguistic contexts of Pakistan and Catalonia (here only outlined, for space constraints) are completely different, since their historical, political and socioeconomic conditions make it not possible to establish parallelisms between them. Pakistan, frequently troubled with violence (see UN, 2019), is an officially (postcolonial) Islamic

country with a governance system based on religion, whereas Catalonia is officially a secular society (as stated in the 1978 Spanish Constitution). The multilingualisms in both societies are hardly comparable, too. In terms of 'autochthonous' languages, in Pakistan there exist more than 70, including English, Urdu and Punjabi, which are, respectively, the official, national and regional languages (the latter along with Sindhi), together with three other 'major' languages with no institutional statuses: Pashto, Siraiki and Balochi (Lewis, Simons & Fennig, 2011; Rahman, 2006) – by contrast, officially, in Catalonia there are only two 'allochtonous' languages (see Section 1.2). This means that the linguistic categorisations used by informants when they *name* home and host languages, as well as the ideological associations that they make between languages (e.g., when they draw comparisons between Urdu/Spanish and Catalan/Punjabi; in Section 3), shall be understood as the informants' *discursive tools* and *narrative strategies* to make sense of, and to try to present, the meanings that terms like 'language' and 'dialect' bear in both societies.

2.3. Methods, data and participants

The data presented in this paper comes from a larger project, which consisted of a two-year network ethnography of 20 migrants who were born in Pakistan, Morocco, Romania and various countries of Latin America. They were aged between 27 and 52, and arrived in Spain between 2002 and 2010. Most of them were undocumented, under/unemployed and unschooled. They networked daily in a migrant-tailored 'ethnic' call shop, run by a 27-year-old Pakistani employee, which welcomed between 61 and 157 clients a day, and which was located in a Spanish-speaking, impoverished working-class neighbourhood in the Barcelona metropolitan area. In the said larger project, the

call shop served as an alternative migrant institution where migrants (particularly the undocumented) could gain access to resources for transnational subsistence (like advice on legality issues, rooms for rent, cheap phone calls or remittances services) off the radar of registration authorities (for the details on this project see Sabaté i Dalmau, 2014).

This paper zooms in on the daily lives of a small group of four Pakistani men within this larger network of 20 migrants, whom I approach as case-study informants whose transnational lives are illustrative of the diasporic self-employer and employee profiles described in Section 1.1. I shadowed these four informants for two years (between 2007 and 2009), at the very least twice a week, for two to 12 hours (I moved to the neighbourhood and lived in a block of flats next to the call shop where they networked). The four informants (with pseudonyms) were the following:[3]

(1) 41-year-old Shabbir was a member of the Pakistani intelligentsia born in an urban town in the Kashmir area. He migrated alone in 2006, rented a flat with five relatives, and started to work as a self-employed construction worker.

(2) 42-year-old Sheema, from a small Pakistani rural town without electrical infrastructure, migrated in 2005 and was then living with his wife and two adolescent children. He was working informally as a waiter in a 'Latino' bar, while simultaneously studying to obtain a taxi-driver license.

(3) Yousaf, a 41-year-old electrician, non-literate, arrived in 2002 from a small rural Pakistani town, unemployed and homeless, lived in Sheema's flat.

(4) Naeem, the call shop worker, was born in Gujranwala, near Lahore, the second biggest city in Pakistan, and was then living with four young Pakistani adults. He had been hired as a part-time employee by a co-national employer who owned three more 'ethnic' businesses in different towns, and, at the time when

the study took place, was suffering exploitation, being forced to work 12-hour shifts and not having been paid for three months.

From the larger project described above, the following data was selected for this paper: (1) extensive ethnographic fieldnotes, with seven ethnographic snapshots,[4] (2) five excerpts and short statements taken from three audio-recorded semi-formal interviews (conducted in front of the call shop or in the 'Latino' bar, in the languages of the informants' choice),[5] and, finally, (3) two hand-written notes selected from all the visual materials gathered in the 'ethnic' business.

3. Analysis

The analysis section is organised as follows. I first focus on the informants' self/other-ascribed identity categorisations as (non)-legitimate (or non-speakers) of their host-society languages, Catalan and Spanish, and on their practices and attitudes towards them (Section 3.1). I then analyse three of their home languages, firstly by exploring the multifaceted linguistic ideologies, connotations and identity (dis)-affiliations with English, which vary depending on whether these were mobilised within the Pakistani network (in an intra-group manner) or in public, in interactions with local populations or with other migrant groups (Section 3.2). Secondly, I present the informants' positive attitudes and identity affiliations to Urdu, by means of which they display alignment with, and belonging to, the (diasporic) Islamic nation-building project for present-day Pakistan (Section 3.3). In the third place, I explore the silenced life of Punjabi, for which informants show disaffection in public, on constructing it as an unimportant minority language of scarce intimate use, with identity connotations linked to illiteracy,

rurality and socioeconomic backwardness (Section 3.4). The overall findings of this section concerning the meanings of these sociolinguistic hierachisations and linguistic identity dynamics, and what they can reveal with regard to home language maintenance (or change) in the diaspora, are presented in Section 4.

3.1. Host languages: Delanguaging the Pakistani diaspora

'*Hablar en español, que estamos en España*' [Speak in Spanish, we are in Spain] (fieldnotes 30/08/2008). This is what Jenny, an unemployed 35-year-old local single mother, said to call-shop worker Naeem, while he was having a smoke and conversing in Urdu with his 20-year-old flatmate Rachid.'*¡Habla más claro!*' [Speak more clearly!], complained Ronny, a middle-aged unemployed Bolivian, when trying to follow Naeem's instructions to move to another phone cabin, on another occasion (fieldnotes 30/06/2008). 'A *mi no me gusta el pakistaní, sólo el árabe*' [I don't like 'Pakistani', I only like Arabic], Yalda, a 12-year-old girl born in Morocco (and schooled in Barcelona), told Naeem later that summer (fieldnotes 22/08/2008).

These three remarks are illustrative of the local populations' as well as of other migrant groups' attitudes towards the Pakistani diaspora's host and home language resources. The first comment illustrates how Spanish is ideologically constructed as the code which indexes 'proper' migrant sociolinguistic behaviour (in fact, the three remarks were made in this language), and of how 'allochtonous'-code uses get reprimanded, with their users being categorised as 'non-integrated' or as 'unwilling to integrate'. As I have shown elsewhere (see Sabaté-Dalmau, 2018), Catalan is not considered to be part of the language repertoires in the neighbourhood under study, and questions concerning Pakistanis' use of Catalan indexed surprise, disbelief and even

annoyance. This is illustrated by Shabbir, who commented that '*En cinco seis años no he visto ni una persona hablar catalán*' [In five six years I haven't seen a single person speaking Catalan] –despite the researcher's use of this language with him (interview 10/08/2008).

The second comment epitomises how Pakistani migrants are attributed 'immigrantese' foreigner talk (Ferguson, 1975), which ascribes this diaspora 'incompetent' and 'deficient' Spanish-speaking identities. Further evidence of this was provided by Naeem, who kept asking me to 'correct' his SMS written in this language, and who kept telling me '*¿Lo ves*? *No les gusta*' [See? They don't like it [my Spanish]] when he faced comments like Ronny's (fieldnotes 30/06/2008). The third and last comment illustrates that other migrant networks in the call shop (and local populations, too) have scarce knowledge of the Pakistani diaspora's languages, and that this Pakistani group gets attributed a linguistic identity as monolingual speakers of an under-defined code called '*Pakistaní*', following a monolingualist 'one nation, one language' approach to multilingual resources (Piller, 2015).

All in all, this demonstrates that informants were not seen as proficient host-language users, despite their insistence on presenting themselves as efficient speakers of one of them, Spanish. Efforts to 'prove' continued and effective Spanish-language learning investments were seen, for example, when Sheema presented himself as a *'Paquistaní medio español'* [half-Spaniard Pakistani] (interview 24/09/2008); when Shabbir 'Spanishised' his name by calling himself 'Chema' (/'ʈʂemɑ/), and insisted that '*Nosotros hablamos de de castellano*' [We speak of of Castilian] (interview 10/08/2008); or when Naeem chose the option 'Spanish Spain' (i.e. Peninsular Spanish) as the default language of all computer programs in the call shop. Thus, despite their efforts to show compliance with the expected norms of sociolinguistic interaction in

Spanish-only in the neighbourhood, informants are dispossessed of host-language resources and are assumed to be conducting their transnational lives in a largely imagined (and maintained) home language.

3.2. Home languages: '*English es number one en el mundo*'

All informants constructed English in positive terms as a global lingua franca, rather than as a home language, and they publicly (and proudly) presented themselves as proficient users of it. The informants' emphasis on the positive connotations of this language in the global sphere, rather than on their local (colonial) heritage values, which downplays the 'institutional-language' role that English has today in most spheres of social life in Pakistan, may be related to the fact that the 'official' status attributed to English there is controversial. This is so because the 1973 Pakistani Constitution states that 'the English language may be used for official purposes until arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu' (Rahman, 2006: 74), with a subclause (in Article 251) which explicitly allows for the use of English as the dominant language until the (underspecified) 'arrangements' are made for the officialisation of Urdu to be made effective in the fields of administration, law, education and commerce. In other words, the Pakistani Constitution implicitly assigns English a *de facto* 'national' status and grants it a higher rank than Urdu, the home language of choice and of (religious) identity affiliation of the informants (see Section 3.3). This may explain why they left the local uses, roles and connotations of English as a key local language in Pakistan unmentioned.

The informants' self-identification with the use of English as a global lingua franca helped them to counteract identities that categorised them as 'non-literate' or

‘non-schooled’, particularly in written communication. This is so because for Catalans, as for Pakistanis, English is a sign of education. While adult Pakistanis tend to understand spoken English, most Catalans are not proficient enough to use it effectively for intercultural communication (Eurobarometer, 2012: 11; Idescat, 2018b). This does not mean that English-speaking Pakistanis are attributed higher linguistic competence in oral practice, though, since ‘Pakistani English’ (as defined in Rahman, 2015), like most South Asian Englishes, tends to be dismissed as ‘incomplete’ and faulty, in Catalonia (Codó, 2008). Both facts (Catalans’ low command of English and Pakistanis’ censoring of their oral competence in it) may explain why English was not used by informants to interact with locals or with other migrant groups.

This diaspora uses written English primarilz as a resource to navigate technology-mediated communication. It is also a (symbolic) resource to present themselves as having a command of global technoliteracy in English (which local neighbours may not possess). In this sense, English was the transliterating code employed in written mobile phone communication, to navigate between the (Perso)-Arabic script and the Roman alphabet when using Urdu (and/or Punjabi). It was also the translation tool employed to access imprecise information provided in Spanish, by means of the application Google Translator. The use of English for English-Urdu (or Punjabi) transliteration and for the self-ascription of English-user identities is illustrated in Excerpt 1 (see transcription conventions in the Appendix), with the case of Shabbir. In our interview, Shabbir claims to communicate by English SMS with relatives (lines 4 and 8), and to use English-only phone settings, too (lines 5-6), with a keyboard in the Roman alphabet, as a matter of ‘preference’ (line 10), ‘easiness’ (line 16) and immediacy (‘quickness’; line 18). Also, he emphatically shows proof of English

command in the written mode (and therefore, of global technoliteracy) by reading each of the English setting names in his mobile phone to the researcher.

Excerpt 1

	@Bck:		10/08/2008. Bar near the call shop. Shabbir (SHA) talks about the languages in which his SMSes with Pakistani relatives are conducted, and shows his phone settings to the researcher.
	1	*RES:	y los del Pakistán no mandan mensajes?
		%tra:	and those from Pakistan don't they send messages?
	2	*SHA:	también mandan.
		%tra:	they do as well.
		[...]	
	3	*RES:	y en qué lenguas?
		%tra:	and in which languages?
→	4	*SHA:	lengua de inglés.
		%tra:	English language.
→	5	*RES:	en inglés # <y tiene el <u>setting</u> del móvil en inglés también> [?].
		%tra:	in English # <and do you have the mobile phone setting in English too> [?].
→	6	*SHA:	sí.
		%tra:	yes.
	7	*RES:	vale.
		%tra:	ok.
→	8	*SHA:	siempre utilizo inglés lengua de inglés.
		%tra:	I always use English the English language.
		[...]	
	9	*RES:	y cómo es eso?
		%tra:	and why is this so?
→	10	*SHA:	porque me prefiero este # por eso [=! laugh] sabes # mira.
		%tra:	because I prefer this one # that's why [=! laugh] you know # look.
		%act:	Shabbir shows his mobile phone setting, the researcher reads the screen out loud.
	11	*RES:	<u>names</u>.
	12	*SHA:	sí este.
		%tra:	yes that one.
	13	*RES:	<u>applications</u>.
	14	*SHA:	eso.
		%tra:	that's it.

	15	*RES:	es más fácil de entender así?
		%tra:	is it easier to understand like this?
→	16	*SHA:	para mi es más fácil sí.
		%tra:	it's easier for me yes.
		[...]	
	17	*RES:	sí.
		%tra:	yes.
→	18	*SHA:	he aprendido más rápido por eso.
		%tra:	I have learned more quickly that's why.

Use of English depended on whether informants interacted with Pakistani compatriots or with local neighbours and other migrant groups. In general terms, and in public, informants associated English with cosmopolitan transnational identities invested in the consumption culture, understood in positive terms as being a sign of engagement with a 'global citizenship', as outlined above. This is seen with Naeem's insistence on playing English pop music by Céline Dion on the central computer (he was the one who said that '*English es number one en el mundo*' [English is number one in the world]), and on Rachid's demands for combining this pop music with American hip hop (see Pennycook, 2007, for an analysis of similar post-modern identities mediated through English).

Among Pakistanis, though, attitudes towards English were multifaceted and ambivalent, since for them, knowing about the 'official English' debates in Pakistan, this seemed to be a politicised language also in terms of personal religious affiliations and of socioeconomic professional positions, in Pakistan as well as in the diaspora (see, also, Paolillo, 1996). For Sheema, who, when Naeem or Shabbir spoke English or listened to English music, stated (in English!) 'I hate English!', this language was envisioned as part of a neocolonial project of supranational control exerted upon former English-speaking colonies like Pakistan (under British rule until 1947). Sheema's construction of English as a 'coloniser' language in the Muslim world is part of his

transnational political and religious project to reject military intervention in his Islamic home country. He even denied having English resources and strongly criticised English-user identities mobilised by other Pakistani informants, whom he categorised as being unfaithful to an Islamic political mode of governance and to an Urdu-speaking Muslim identity, which he understood as being part and parcel of the modern Pakistani nation-building project with which he aligns (see, also, Section 3.3).

In socioeconomic terms, English was an intra-group sign of class distinction (as detailed in Mansoon, 2004; Rahman, 2002). For Shabbir, for example, English was indexical of a superior class status of the wealthy intelligentsia in Pakistan, which includes business people, lobbyists, military officers and high-rank bureaucrats (particularly for those who, like him, migrated from Punjabi-speaking regions to urban cities and capital regions). He tried to re-appropriate this status in order to present himself as a more advantaged migrant when networking with other Pakistanis in Catalonia. Shabbir's wife was an English teacher, and his children (living in 'Pakistani' Kashmir) were being educated in an English-medium private school (mostly reserved for economically advantaged Muslims, in Kashmir), which allowed him to present himself as part of an upper-class elite with powerful transnational contacts (he actually signs his SMSs with 'Mughal', in Urdu, which stands for 'mogul' or 'influential person'; fieldnotes 24/12/2008). He chose to mobilise his socioeconomic and educational trajectory (attained through his investment in English) when interacting with Sheema, who was unschooled and was born in a rural town with defective electrical infrastructure, when they both competed for the leadership of the Muslim community in Barcelona (for instance, when working on a petition to establish a mosque in the neighbourhood). In this sense, English-speaking identities are used as 'a passport to privilege' (Rahman, 2005: 24) to reinforce pre-existing social class, political

and religious statuses, which get re-territorialised and can be observed in the 'internal' social organisation of informants. These power dynamics reveal their (partly symbolic) 'language battles' or competitions of linguistic capitals for the leadership of the local Muslim group or for gaining access to contacts with other Muslim members of the European Pakistani diaspora, which seemed to pass unnoticed by local populations and other migrant groups alike.

3.3. Home languages: 'Hope is in Urdu'

Urdu was the home language which informants chose as a modern lingua franca in daily communication among themselves, regardless of whether they were Urdu- or Punjabi-dominant speakers, once again engaging in the monolingual mind-set. It was, in fact, presented as the taken-for-granted legitimate nation-state language of Islamic Pakistan, following the frequently circulated precept that 'service to Urdu is service to Pakistan' (widely commented in media reports; see, e.g., Raj, 2017)..

The use of Urdu as a migrant Pakistanis' lingua franca is seen, for instance, when Sheema found an offer with cheap phone cards to call Pakistan written in Spanish, and decided to translate it into Urdu in order to make it accessible to the Urdu-reading community (fieldnotes 4/09/2008). This also turned Urdu into one of the 'institutional' commercial languages of the place, now demarcated as a 'Pakistani' business (and, I believe, as a Muslim space), in an institution (a call shop) which does not normally recognise its entrepreneurial use (none of the 30 telecommunications businesses that were operating in Spain at that time, including 'ethnic' operators targeting Pakistanis, offered customer services in this language; see Sabaté i Dalmau, 2012).

Urdu indexed both traditional and modern 'Pakistaniness' for all informants, and was presented as a 'symbol of unity' (Rahman, 2006: 74). As outlined in the previous sections, in 1948 Urdu was made 'the national language' by the President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and first Governor-General Ali Jinnah, member of the Pakistan Muslim League, who was born in Karachi when this city was still under the British India's rule, and who pioneered the Pakistan movement to become a Muslim-majority state, independent from predominantly Hindi India.

Urdu was the first language that informants mentioned when they were asked about their linguistic backgrounds and multilingual resources. The presentation of Urdu as 'the language of Pakistanis' is illustrated by Shabbir, who shows how he was learning Spanish in order to pass his taxi-driver licence theory test by translating specific vocabulary into Urdu first, and then to English, as a second-place language (see connotations concerning English in Section 3.2), written below, and placed at the bottom, as seen in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Public use of Urdu by a Pakistani learner of Spanish, placed before English, which was presented as a second-place language (picture taken from Sabaté i Dalmau, 2014: 79).

Shabbir gave me an Urdu-Spanish dictionary so that I could learn 'their language', and he kept showing me videoclips with pop songs by Roxen ('Hope', in Urdu), mobilising a feeling of pride in public (home) 'national' language use, taking it for granted that it is the 'real' Pakistani language, to the detriment of Punjabi – leaving controversial policies concerning the 'Urdufication' of minority language-speaking communities in Pakistan (like the Punjabi- and Bengali-speaking communities) unmentioned (see, also, Section 3.4).

There were also some minor attempts to present Urdu as the language to be employed in public among Pakistanis as a legitimate language of incorporation, which challenges the 'Spanish-as-the-language-of-integration' dictum. This was so, for instance, when Shabbir seemed to position Urdu as 'better' than Spanish, on one occasion in which he opposed Pakistanis' communicative politeness to that of the local '*españolas*' (['Spanish women']), who, he claimed, lacked manners, indirectly presenting the informal registers of this host language with censorious overtones, and attributing local women low (religious) morality values: '*Dicen cago en Dios, coño, joder*… ¡*Esto es muy malo, eh*!' ([They] say goddamnit, damn, fuck…. This is really very bad, eh!) (fieldnotes 22/08/2008).

3.4. Home languages: '*Punjabi es como catalán*'

Yousaf and Naeem were 'native'-speakers of Punjabi, a language which they could use with Shabbir, who was proficient in it, too. However, in public, the three of them seemed to make this language choice invisible, in sociolinguistic behaviours denoting some degree of embarrassment for having been born into a 'vernacular' code which it is

not considered a 'national' language, as opposed to other regional languages like Sindhi, also minoritised, which has fewer speakers (about 14.1% of the Pakistani population; Rahman, 2006: 73, Pakistan Bureau Statistics, 2017). In fact, it has been noted that in some parts of Pakistan 'there is a culture-shame about Punjabi' (Rahman, 2006: 80), which includes the denial of a 'mother-tongue' command on the part of some educated speakers as well as complaints about the 'Punjabisation of Urdu' (see Siddiqi, 2012: 97). This is so because Punjabi is associated with the language of the 'Paendu' (i.e., the illiterate 'provincial poor' and the 'yokel'; Rahman, 2006: 74) – as well as with the language for mockery in informal contexts, in the form of songs and jokes This may be the reason why informants' intra-group communication in Punjabi tended to be relegated to the backstage, demeaned as anecdotal and unimportant, and even at times hidden as having occurred in 'Urdu'.

For Urdu-dominant Pakistanis like Sheema, who did not allow his children to use Punjabi at home in Pakistan, conversations among informants in Punjabi were object to reprimand. This is so not only because of the socioeconomic connotations mentioned above, but also because the use of Punjabi was taken up, by informants like Shabbir, as a sign of (religious) 'ethnic resistance' (Rahman, 2006: 83) –in this case, in the diaspora- to the Islamic Pakistani nation-building project (particularly by minorities from the northern Eastern regions), with which none of the informants wanted to be associated. The negative connotations that this minority home language had within the Pakistani network are illustrated in Excerpt 2, where Shabbir and Yousaf reflect upon their language choices in the privacy of their rented flat.

Excerpt 2

	@Bck:		22/08/2008. Bar near the call shop. Shabbir (SHA) and Yousaf (YOU) talk about their 'home' languages and equate the sociolinguistic status of Punjabi in Pakistan to that of Catalan in Catalonia.
	1	*RES:	y: vosotros en qué habláis en urdu en casa?
		%tra:	a:nd you what do you speak do you speak Urdu at home?
→	2	*SHA:	sí: punjabi.
		%tra:	yes Punjabi.
	3	*RES:	ah punjabi!
→	4	*YOU:	es como catalán.
		%tra:	it's like Catalan.
→	5	*SHA:	cada uno país tiene uno: # <cómo se llama> [?] # como catalán o como punjabi y siempre en casa y hablando así.
		%tra:	each one country has one: # <what is it called> [?] # like Catalan or Punjabi and always at home and talking like this.

Shabbir had told me that he normally spoke Urdu at home, so I had wrongly assumed that his flatmate Yousaf would also use Urdu to talk to him. However, Yousaf was not born in the Kashmir area, and both in Pakistan and in the flat that they shared he mostly spoke Punjabi (as explained by Shabbir in line 2), which is much more frequently used than Urdu in Pakistan (see Section 1.2). Yousaf, offering clarification, explained that Punjabi is a language that is 'like Catalan' (line 4). Shabbir, expanding on this, stated that the sociolinguistic role that Punjabi fulfils in their home country is that of being 'the more relegated language' that most states tend to have at the backstage, aside from their respective official or national languages; that is, a language to be used in private (line 5) – locally and transnationally.

What I infer from Shabbir's and Yousaf's attitudes toward Punjabi and Catalan is that they perceived both languages as having only intra-family, or intimate, use. The description that they provide almost resembles that of a case of diglossia, where the supremacy of both Urdu and Spanish and the inferiority of Punjabi and Catalan are taken for granted. I argue that this may be so because of the discursive strategies mobilised by the informants to try to unpack the complexities of the Pakistani

sociolinguistic context, with non-comparable labels for institutional or official statuses (such as, 'national or 'regional'). In sum, Excerpt 2 shows that Punjabi, like Catalan, was conceptually placed outside the call shop and the neighbourhood, and it was not conceived of as a language that belonged to the diasporic Pakistanis' public multilingual repertoire.

The language ideologies and identities around Punjabi, as well as the linguistic hierarchisations described so far, though, were at times challenged. This is seen when someone in the call shop posted a hand-written message in Punjabi, posting this language in the linguistic landscape (i.e. the multilingual iconography) of that diasporic place (see Figure 2).



Figure 2: The presence of hidden-in-public minority home languages like Punjabi in an 'ethnic' business (with confidential information removed). Picture taken from Sabaté i Dalmau (2014: 138).

Informants explained that the message in Figure 2 was addressed to Naeem, a Punjabi defender, for it called the persons from Gujranwala (like him) 'heroes', reading '*Hero puray Gujranwale da*' ('You are the hero of the whole Gujranwala'), with the word

'hero' in English, capitalised. I suggest that this digraphic note in the call-shop wall may also be interpreted as an 'intra-group' sign of support to a migrant employee who, by virtue of being 'delanguaged' (Gal, 2006) or dispossessed of home and host communicative resources on a daily basis (as a speaker of 'immigrantese' Spanish), was also 'deskilled' in terms of work-management abilities by local and non-Pakistani clients who complained about his 'poor' customer services. In this regard, small texts like the one in Figure 2 may be read as minority home-language maintenance actions against their 'ideological erasure' (Irvine & Gal, 2000), which may speak of resistance to social exclusion of silenced minorities within migrant groups in the diaspora, at least in this Muslim 'Pakistani'-demarcated place.

4. Findings

The analysis presented above offers five main findings concerning the meanings of the linguistic hierachisations and identity enactments involving host and home languages. These may contribute to an understanding of language maintenance practices in the diaspora. Firstly, with regards to findings concerning host languages, the data shows that informants make every attempt to invest in the majority language, Spanish. This is the language required by the administration for naturalisation, by local populations for incorporation into the neighbourhood, and by migrant groups for intercultural communication (regardless of their linguistic backgrounds). It also provides evidence that, despite their efforts to present themselves as proficient users of this language, and in spite of their presentations of self as law-abiding persons 'willing to integrate' through the learning of this code, informants are categorised as 'deficient' Spanish

speakers. Therefore, they are systematically delegitimised as majority host-language speakers. Secondly, the data concerning Catalan shows that this language is conceived of as being external to the informants' social enculturation and, in this regard, this minority language is, in ideology and in practice, excluded from migrant socialisation spaces and, generally, from Spanish-speaking neighbourhoods.

With regards to the three findings concerning home languages, the analysis illustrates, first, how informants, in public, construct English as a global lingua franca (rather than as a home language), and mobilise it to align themselves with modern 'global-citizen' presentations of the technoliterate post-national self. The data also shows, though, that, among themselves, English is highly politicised, on holding the status of the *de facto* 'national' language (in direct competition with Urdu), in Pakistan. On the one hand, it is at times rejected as being part of current anti-Muslim political projects exerted upon Pakistan, and, as such, it is presented as a 'coloniser' language. On the other hand, for informants who come from (Kashmiri) advantaged socioeconomic and educational backgrounds, English is mobilised as a sign of political power, which helps its speakers compete for important resources in the diaspora (like local religious leadership or important contacts with co-nationals somewhere else in the EU).

Secondly, the findings provide evidence that informants take pride in Urdu, as they envision and invest in it as the only legitimate home (nation-state-building) language; that is, as a sign of modern Islamic 'Pakistaniness'. Finally, the data points to the fact that Punjabi is, by contrast, silenced and at times even called or hidden as 'Urdu', because it is devalued and categorised (even by its speakers) as the 'homey' intimate heritage language of the poor and illiterate. Accordingly, Punjabi-speaking identities and affiliations remain invisible, despite some occasional attempts to

incorporate this language in this 'Muslim' 'Pakistani' place, in actions which quite informatively speak of the informants' commitment to minority home-language maintenance.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, I have provided a critical sociolinguistics ethnographic approach to home and host language ideologies and identity practices by four Pakistani men who networked in a Southern European bilingual society, Catalonia. More specifically, I have taken a political economic perspective on the ways in which their ideologies and language-mediated social categorisations interplay and mutually inform each other, shedding light onto newer linguistic hierarchisations, in the diaspora. I have argued that this approach may offer a more comprehensive picture of diasporic linguistic incorporation practices linked to home language maintenance (and change), because it allows for the problematization of 'fixed', territorialised notions of languages and speakers, in multilingual transnational migration contexts.

To this end, I have taken the four Pakistani migrants' language resources, understood as individual multilingual-competence repositories (limited to Spanish, Catalan, English, Urdu and Punjabi), as the locus whereby to understand the rationalities behind their socially-stratifying linguistic behaviours, on a case-study basis, ethnographically analysed for over two years. This has allowed me to ingrain situated and contextualised micro language ideology displays and identity enactments with macro socioeconomic transformations and political structures which govern the citizenship regimes and language-based personhood legitimacies of the globalised new

economy. This has helped me to unpack the complex ways in which Pakistani migrants' home languages got re-territorialised and re-politicised in interactions among themselves, with other migrant groups, and with local populations.

With regard to Pakistanis diasporic sociolinguistic behaviour, the findings show that informants share a strong monolingual mind-set concerning their home and host language resources. This provides further evidence of the pervasiveness of monolingual ideologies in multilingual diasporic contexts, within migrant groups which are systematically sanctioned precisely on the basis of their multilingual practices. In this sense, this paper speaks of how migrants in the diaspora may participate in, and reproduce, the exclusionary language-mediated social categorisation practices to which they are subjected, both in their host and home societies. Linked to this, the paper also shows that migrants' languages remain largely unknown and unmanaged not only in institutional domains (which has long been attested for the EU; see Hogan-Brun, Mar-Molinero & Stevenson, 2009), but also in spaces which are regulated by and for migrants themselves. In these alternative spaces, too, linguistic diversity is perceived as a 'problem' and is managed through the establishment of a unified floor in and only in the majority host language.

In sum, this paper sheds light on how migrants in diasporic contexts foster language maintenance of home nation-sate majority codes only, downplaying the use, and hindering the vitality of, home minority languages, in migration contexts where their speakers are already positioned as delanguaged and deskilled. This may further exacerbate practices of social differentiation and exclusion on the basis of language, in less-researched, non-institutional spaces in the global arena.

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Notes

[1] Quotation marks (as in 'illegal', 'ethnic', etc.) are employed throughout this paper to highlight emic descriptions of migrant populations. The adjectives 'home' and 'host', used to make reference to the languages that originated, respectively, in Pakistan and Catalonia, are not to be taken as dichotomous or mutually exclusive, since I approach informants as multilingual individuals making use of all the language resources that they possess (see Section 2).

[2] In this paper, I only analyse on English, Urdu and Punjabi, which were the only home languages mentioned by informants during the study. This means that I only focus on the prevalent languages in Pakistan, thereby downplaying the other home languages that may be part of the informants' linguistic background and of their multilingual resources (see Section 2.2).

[3] The data was collected with voice informed consent and was anonymised. The protection of the informants' identities was ensured by the Ethics Committee at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (file reference and confidentiality protocol CEEAH 725H).

[4] No audio-recordings took place inside the call shop, since the cooperative of lawyers *Col.lectiu Ronda* who advised me on legality matters throughout the research process warned me that voice recognition techniques could be used to identify undocumented individuals.

[5] Due to my very limited knowledge of the informants' languages, these choices were reduced to Catalan, Spanish and English, with Spanish clearly predominating as their choice.

Appendix: Transcription system

Language coding

Plain: Spanish

Italics: Catalan

<u>Underlined: English</u>

Conventions

@Bck:	Background information
%com:	contextual information about the previous turn
%tra:	free translation of the turn for languages other than English
[=!]	body language, proxemics
#	pause
[/]	repetition
< >	scope
:	lengthened vowel
[…]	Turns omitted for space or confidentiality constraints
.	end-of-turn falling contour
?	end-of-turn rising contour

!	end-of-turn exclamation contour